EDITORIAL: Optimizing defense manufacturing

Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo (顧立雄) Tuesday said that US policy toward Taiwan has not changed and that Taipei is in continuous talks with Washington about arms sales. He added that 66 F-16V fighter jets are being readied for delivery after production delays.

Koo’s comments come as a record US$14 billion arms package remains stalled following US-China talks, amid pressure from Beijing to halt arms sales to Taiwan. Analysts expect sales to continue, although they might face short-term delays as Washington and Beijing seek to manage tensions ahead of two planned summits later this year.

For Taiwan, the lesson should be broader.

Taiwan cannot control US production capacity, US foreign policy or the demands placed on the US military. However, it can control how much of its own defense requirements it can produce.

The nation has almost US$30 billion in approved but undelivered US arms. The backlog predates the war with Iran and reflects production constraints, supply-chain problems and long manufacturing schedules. US military operations in the Middle East have added pressure to munitions stockpiles, demonstrating another vulnerability for countries that depend on US weapons.

This is not an argument for abandoning US procurement. Taiwan needs US systems that it cannot readily reproduce, but it should also accelerate domestic research, development and production wherever doing so is feasible.

The National Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology produced 2,577 missiles over the past five years, including Hsiung Feng II and III anti-ship missiles, Wan Chien air-to-ground missiles and Tien Kung air-defense missiles. Production capacity is growing.

The significance is not simply that Taiwan can design sophisticated missiles. It is that it is demonstrating an ability to manufacture them at scale.

That distinction matters in a war. A fighter jet or submarine might remain in service for years, but an interceptor or anti-ship missile can be expended in seconds. If Taiwan cannot replenish those weapons during a conflict, even a technologically advanced arsenal could eventually become depleted.

That makes Taiwan’s proposed T-Dome air-defense system an important test of its ambitions.

T-Dome is intended to combine US systems such as Patriot PAC-3 MSE and NASAMS with indigenous missiles, sensors and command systems. One of the planned components is the Strong Bow interceptor, designed to counter tactical ballistic missiles.

Strong Bow illustrates what Taiwan has achieved and what remains to be done. Developing an interceptor is one challenge. Producing sufficient quantities, maintaining the hardware and integrating it into a larger air-defense network are much bigger ones.

It does not need to reproduce the entire US defense industry. That would be unrealistic. Instead, it should prioritize capabilities that would be consumed rapidly in a conflict and would be particularly difficult to replenish if foreign deliveries were interrupted.

That means missiles and defensive interceptors, but also drones, counter-drone systems, artillery rounds and other ordnance. It means developing domestic supply chains for the components required to keep those weapons in production. And it means ensuring that factories and production capacity are sufficiently dispersed and resilient to survive a war.

Taiwan’s indigenous submarine program offers another example. The Hai Kun (Narwhal, 海鯤) has progressed to sea trials, demonstrating that Taiwan can undertake highly complex defense projects domestically. However, the program has shown how difficult and time-consuming it can be to develop a new industrial capability from the ground up.

Ten years is both a long and a short time.

It is long enough for Taiwan to substantially expand missile production, stockpiles and domestic supply chains, but it might be surprisingly short if the goal is to create an industrial base capable of sustaining production during a major war.

Nor can Taiwan assume that domestic production would guarantee readiness if China attacked before those capabilities matured. Factories, supply chains and production facilities would be vulnerable to attack, while critical components could still depend on foreign suppliers.

The objective should be to reach a point where an interruption in US deliveries creates a serious problem for Taiwan, but does not leave critical parts of its defense dependent on a supply line it cannot control.

Taiwan has already demonstrated that it can develop sophisticated missiles and other advanced weapons. The more urgent question is whether it can produce enough of them, quickly enough, and maintain the industrial capacity to replace them during a conflict.

That is a question Taiwan has a limited amount of time to answer.