Trump-Xi summit hard to swallow

Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) received two different welcomes within the space of 10 days — one in New Delhi and the other in Washington. In diplomatic protocol, the two could hardly have been more different. Yet, in their own ways, neither appeared particularly easy for Xi to digest. The discomfort seemed to show not merely in diplomacy, but almost physically.

Xi appeared distinctly uneasy in India. At one point during the BRICS summit, it was noticeable enough for host Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to interrupt himself and ask Xi: “Are you OK?”

Xi did not attend the dinner that evening and left New Delhi early the next day.

Ten days later, when he landed in the world’s most powerful country, the reception was dramatically different. US President Donald Trump broke with decades of tradition to personally receive Xi at the airport.

During that visit, Xi’s face did not betray the same discomfort visible in India, but neither did he appear entirely at ease. At the White House dinner, Taiwanese music played in the background, and a choir performed songs from Les Miserables. To assume that the symbolism embedded in such music escaped the attention of the Chinese leadership would itself be diplomatic naivety.

These contrasting styles of welcome reveal something about the changing world order.

Who accords importance to whom — and how much? Why does one country embrace another while a third keeps its distance? Behind ceremonial protocol lie friendship and hostility, competition and rivalry, strategic proximity and strategic distance. These signals might also tell us something about the direction in which the world is heading.

In India, it was neither practical nor appropriate for Modi to personally receive every head of state at the airport. Protocol demands broadly comparable treatment at summits such as BRICS. That is why even Russian President Vladimir Putin, despite his close relationship with Modi, was received by the same level of ministerial representation that greeted Xi.

India was, in many ways, a reluctant host for Xi. He was visiting the country for the first time in seven years. The dark shadow of Galwan might have faded somewhat, but the wounds have not entirely healed. Troops might have disengaged from face-to-face positions along parts of the disputed Himalayan border, but mutual trust has hardly been restored — and Washington was watching.

Throughout the summit, India appeared deliberately restrained. That control manifested itself in several ways. Even the official briefing on the summit was conducted at the Sherpa-secretary level. Forget the Indian minister of external affairs — even the foreign secretary did not address the press briefing.

The BRICS declaration was a substantial achievement precisely because it accommodated widely differing interests. Yet neither Modi nor Indian Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar appeared eager to publicly claim political credit for it.

There was a reason for that restraint: Washington was watching with considerable suspicion. It was concerned about de-dollarization. It was also watching a gathering representing nearly half of humanity.

In that entire constellation, India — and perhaps Oman — could hardly be described as instinctively anti-Western. That left New Delhi with little incentive to display excessive enthusiasm about BRICS becoming an explicitly anti-Western platform.

What kind of diplomacy leads Washington to offer such an extraordinary welcome to the leader of the country it regards as its principal strategic competitor?

What does Trump want from China that he believes can be obtained by keeping Xi happy?

What does the US need from a country on which it imposes tariffs, and the rise of which it seeks to contain — or at least performs the diplomatic theater of containing? What does Washington seek from a China that stands behind Iran and provides Russia crucial support in its war on Ukraine?

The truth is that the US’ behavior is difficult for much of the world to digest.

That is why there is unease — from Taipei to Washington, Tel Aviv, Tehran, Ankara and New Delhi. Where exactly is this difficult-to-digest diplomacy of rebuking friends and embracing adversaries taking the US?

The G7, G20 and NATO increasingly risk looking less like partnerships and more like competing geopolitical gangs. Through the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, another grouping appears to be taking shape, one that is already being described in some quarters as an “Islamic NATO.” BRICS, and to some extent the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, represent counterweights to these formations.

However, the US’ diplomatically unpredictable behavior is scrambling established equations.

Xi is no less unpredictable. What exactly does he want? He is almost as difficult to decipher as Trump. By contrast, the strategic objectives of Putin, Modi and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whether one agrees with them or not, are easier to read.

When the leaders of the world’s two competing powers become simultaneously so unpredictable — and their diplomacy so difficult for everyone else to digest — it might not necessarily mean that catastrophe is imminent, but it certainly does not make for a reassuring world order.

Mukesh Kaushik is an Indian journalist and commentator on strategic affairs, defense and geopolitics. He is a researcher at National Chengchi University on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan Fellowship.