Opinion: Opinion | SCO Was Once Russia's Backyard. How China Is Now Closing In

Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan - is undergoing a significant geopolitical transformation. The region is moving away from the Russia-dominated order that shaped much of its post-Soviet history towards an increasingly China-centric economic landscape. Yet, this is not a straightforward Chinese takeover. Russia retains substantial security, cultural, and institutional influence, while Central Asian states themselves are pursuing increasingly sophisticated multi-vector policies to preserve strategic autonomy.
The emerging order is, therefore, better understood as a redistribution of influence: China is acquiring economic primacy, Russia retains residual strategic leverage, and Central Asian governments are seeking to maximise their room for manoeuvre by diversifying external partnerships. The Ukraine war has accelerated a process that was already underway.

From Russia's Backyard, To China's

Russian influence in Central Asia has deep historical roots. Imperial expansion during the nineteenth century incorporated the region into the Russian political system, while the Soviet Union subsequently integrated it through centralised planning, Russian-language education, shared infrastructure, and elite networks. The Soviet economic architecture was particularly important. Railways, pipelines, and electricity grids were largely oriented northwards towards Russia, while Russian became the region's principal lingua franca. Military institutions, industrial supply chains, and political elites further reinforced Moscow's influence.

Independence in 1991 did not immediately change this structural dependence. Russia remained the principal external actor through security arrangements, energy transit, arms supplies, labour migration, and cultural ties. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan joined the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, while millions of Central Asian workers migrated to Russia, generating significant remittances. Central Asian governments formally adopted multi-vector foreign policies, but geography and inherited infrastructure limited their ability to diversify. For much of the post-Soviet period, Russia remained the unavoidable centre of the region's external relationships.

The Changing Balance

China's growing role has fundamentally altered this equation. Beijing's engagement accelerated after the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in Kazakhstan in 2013. Central Asia offered China a combination of strategic advantages: proximity to Xinjiang, access to energy and minerals, and overland routes connecting China to Europe and the Middle East.

Unlike Russia, whose influence has traditionally rested on security and political networks, China has built its position primarily through trade, infrastructure, energy, and investment.

Chinese trade with Central Asia has expanded rapidly and now significantly exceeds Russian trade with the region. Chinese companies are active in oil and gas, mining, transport, renewable energy, and manufacturing. Chinese automobile brands are increasingly visible in Central Asian markets, symbolising a broader shift in commercial dependence.

Infrastructure is perhaps the most consequential element of China's strategy. Roads, railways, pipelines, and logistics networks are creating east-west connectivity that reduces the region's historical dependence on routes through Russia. The China-Central Asia gas network and projects such as the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway are helping reshape the region's economic geography.

China is also institutionalising its political presence. The China-Central Asia summit mechanism provides Beijing with a direct multilateral platform with all five republics, operating independently of Russian-led institutions. China is also cautiously expanding into security cooperation through arms sales, drones, surveillance capabilities, and limited security involvement, particularly around Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan.

Russia Is Weaker Today

The rise of China does not mean Russia has become irrelevant. Moscow continues to possess important advantages. It remains a major security provider, maintains military infrastructure and institutional relationships, and retains deep cultural influence through the Russian language, media, and education. Soviet-era military equipment also sustains dependence on Russian training and maintenance. However, Russia's relative weight has declined. The war in Ukraine has exposed the limits of Russian economic and military capacity while diverting resources and attention. Western sanctions have complicated established trade and transport routes, while Russia's ability to project itself as an unquestioned security guarantor has been weakened by perceptions of military overstretch.

This is particularly important because the old regional division of labour is changing. Traditionally, China provided economic opportunities while Russia provided security. As Chinese involvement expands into infrastructure, technology, and selected security domains, while Russian economic capacity contracts, this division is becoming less sustainable.

Nevertheless, Moscow and Beijing have little incentive to engage in direct rivalry. Both favour regime stability, oppose Western military influence, and remain concerned about colour revolutions. Economic competition can thus intensify without necessarily producing open geopolitical confrontation.

Central Asian Agency Matters

The Central Asian republics should not be viewed simply as passive objects of Russian-Chinese competition. Their governments are increasingly capable of exercising strategic agency. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in particular, have pursued broader relationships with Turkey, the European Union, Gulf states, Japan, India, and other partners. Uzbekistan's post-2016 opening under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev illustrates the region's broader effort to reduce external dependence.

At the same time, Central Asian states recognise the risks of excessive reliance on China. Chinese capital is welcome, but dependence can create vulnerabilities related to debt, resource ownership, employment, and political influence. Concerns about Chinese economic penetration have periodically generated domestic resistance, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This explains the importance of alternative connectivity projects, such as the Middle Corridor across the Caspian Sea. For Central Asian governments, bypassing Russia does not necessarily mean aligning with the West, just as closer economic relations with China do not imply political subordination to Beijing. The underlying objective is autonomy through diversification.

Three structural forces explain the changing balance. First, China possesses vastly greater economic resources than Russia. Beijing can finance infrastructure, purchase energy at scale, and integrate Central Asia into wider manufacturing and logistics networks. Second, geography gives China a direct strategic interest in Central Asian stability. The region borders Xinjiang and offers Beijing a critical land bridge to western Eurasia. Third, Russia's relative decline, accelerated by the Ukraine war, has encouraged Central Asian governments to seek alternative markets, investment sources, and transport corridors. The result is a region where China increasingly dominates the economic sphere even as Russia retains significant security and cultural influence.

India's Relevance

For India, these developments are strategically consequential. Central Asia is part of New Delhi's extended neighbourhood and matters for energy security, critical minerals, counter-terrorism, connectivity, and the broader balance of power in Eurasia. The problem is the enormous economic asymmetry. India's trade with Central Asia remains a fraction of China's. Geography is the principal constraint: India has no direct land route to the region and must rely heavily on connectivity through Iran, particularly the Chabahar port and the International North-South Transport Corridor.

China's growing dominance could marginalise Indian connectivity ambitions and give Beijing greater influence over regional trade routes, resources, technology standards, and economic norms. A more China-centric Central Asia also removes some of the strategic space that India previously derived from Russia's stronger regional position. Membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) gives India a diplomatic platform, but institutional presence cannot substitute for economic engagement. Without greater commercial and infrastructural involvement, India risks remaining politically relevant but economically marginal.

India should not attempt to match China's financial scale. Its objective should instead be to become a credible third partner for Central Asian states seeking diversification. India has comparative advantages in pharmaceuticals, education, information technology, digital services, capacity-building, and defence training. These sectors can generate influence without requiring the scale of Chinese infrastructure spending.

Critical minerals are another promising area. Central Asia's resource base aligns with India's growing requirements for rare earths and other strategic minerals. Joint ventures, exploration partnerships, and processing capabilities could provide economic and strategic benefits. Connectivity must remain a priority. Chabahar and the INSTC face logistical and geopolitical challenges, but abandoning them would leave China with even greater control over Eurasian connectivity. India should focus on commercially viable projects rather than overly ambitious schemes that cannot be implemented.

Defence cooperation, military training, counter-terrorism, and people-to-people links can further strengthen India's presence. Engagement with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan deserves particular attention, given their economic and diplomatic weight. India can also coordinate with Europe, Japan, the Gulf states, and others in supporting the Middle Corridor and broader regional diversification.

The future of Central Asia will ultimately be shaped by the interaction of Chinese economic power, Russian residual influence, and Central Asian strategic agency. India's relevance will depend on whether it can turn its diplomatic goodwill into sustained economic and strategic engagement.

(Harsh V Pant is Vice President for Studies at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi)