The strategic significance of Starlink in the Russia–Ukraine war: Lessons for Asean — Phar Kim Beng and Vic Li Yu Wai

OCT 17 — The Russia–Ukraine war has fundamentally altered the meaning of military power. Tanks, artillery, missiles and fighter aircraft remain indispensable. Yet the ability to communicate, coordinate, collect intelligence and transmit information in real time has become equally decisive.

At the centre of this transformation is Starlink, the satellite internet constellation operated by SpaceX, the American aerospace company founded by Elon Musk.

What makes Starlink strategically significant is not merely its technological sophistication. It is the manner in which a commercially owned communications network has become deeply embedded in the operational requirements of a sovereign state fighting for its survival.

For Asean, this development carries profound implications. It suggests that the future of national security will depend not only on conventional military capabilities but also on who owns, operates and ultimately controls the digital infrastructure upon which those capabilities increasingly rely.

Ukraine provides an important case study.

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine faced the immediate danger of losing access to critical telecommunications infrastructure. Russian attacks, cyber operations and electronic warfare threatened to undermine the country’s ability to maintain communications between its political leadership, armed forces and civilian population.

Starlink helped fill this gap.

Through thousands of satellite terminals connected to a constellation in low Earth orbit, Ukraine was able to preserve important channels of communication even when terrestrial infrastructure was damaged or disrupted.

This resilience became particularly valuable in a war where the front lines were constantly changing and where the ability to transmit information rapidly could determine the outcome of military engagements.

Starlink was not designed originally as a military communications system. Yet its adaptation to battlefield requirements demonstrated how civilian technologies could acquire enormous strategic value.

Indeed, the distinction between civilian and military infrastructure has become increasingly difficult to sustain.

A satellite terminal that provides internet access to a rural school can also support emergency responders, military logistics or communications between dispersed military units.

This dual-use character of emerging technologies is transforming the strategic landscape.

For Asean, the first lesson is that digital connectivity has become an essential component of national defence.

A country may possess sophisticated military equipment, but its effectiveness can deteriorate rapidly if communications networks are disrupted.

Modern warfare increasingly depends on the integration of sensors, intelligence, command systems and operational units. Without reliable connectivity, even technologically advanced armed forces can become fragmented.

The second lesson concerns the growing influence of private technology companies over questions traditionally reserved for sovereign governments.

Starlink’s involvement in Ukraine has demonstrated that private corporations can become strategically indispensable without being subject to the same political accountability mechanisms as elected governments.

Decisions concerning geographical coverage, access restrictions, technical support and operational conditions may carry significant military and diplomatic consequences.

This creates an uncomfortable question for Asean member states.

Starlink was not designed originally as a military communications system. Yet its adaptation to battlefield requirements demonstrated how civilian technologies could acquire enormous strategic value. — Starlink pic

If a country’s national security infrastructure depends heavily on a foreign commercial provider, how much strategic autonomy does that country genuinely possess?

The answer is not necessarily to reject foreign technologies. Asean economies are deeply integrated into global technological ecosystems, and international partnerships remain essential.

Rather, the challenge is to prevent technological dependence from becoming strategic vulnerability.

The third lesson is even more consequential. Control over digital infrastructure can become an instrument of geopolitical coercion.

This is no longer merely a theoretical concern.

On October 14, 2026, Reuters reported that restrictions on Starlink-related military services had disrupted Ukrainian drone operations. Ukrainian officials said some systems experienced connectivity problems when moving above approximately 160 kilometres per hour. Several military missions were consequently cancelled.

Subsequent reporting distinguished the commercial Starlink service from Starshield, its military-grade counterpart. On October 16, Reuters reported, citing officials familiar with the decision, that the order to limit Starshield had originated inside the White House. The precise chain of responsibility was not publicly established.

The implications are extraordinary.

A country fighting a major war discovered that access to a crucial technological capability could be altered by decisions taken thousands of kilometres away.

Even more revealing, Ukrainian personnel reported that the restrictions affected communications with headquarters and the speed at which battlefield information could be transmitted.

This episode demonstrates that technological superiority does not necessarily translate into strategic independence.

A military may possess advanced drones, precision weapons and sophisticated intelligence systems. Yet if their effectiveness depends upon foreign-controlled networks, operational freedom can become conditional.

Asean must understand this distinction.

The fourth lesson concerns the strategic geography of Southeast Asia.

Unlike Ukraine, which faces a predominantly continental military threat, Asean comprises mainland and maritime states connected by some of the world’s most important waterways.

The South China Sea, Strait of Malacca, Sulu Sea and surrounding maritime approaches are essential to regional security and international commerce.

Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines must protect extensive maritime territories. Vietnam faces persistent strategic pressures in the South China Sea. Singapore depends heavily on uninterrupted digital and commercial connectivity.

For these countries, resilient satellite communications could strengthen maritime domain awareness, emergency response, coastguard operations and the monitoring of remote territories.

Malaysia’s security requirements in Sabah and Sarawak, for instance, demonstrate the importance of reliable communications across geographically dispersed areas.

Satellite connectivity could reinforce surveillance and coordination around the Sulu and Celebes seas, where maritime security challenges extend beyond conventional military threats.

Yet such capabilities should not depend exclusively on one foreign provider.

The fifth lesson concerns the increasingly close relationship between artificial intelligence, automation and satellite communications.

Ukraine has demonstrated how inexpensive unmanned systems, supported by digital networks, can challenge much more expensive military platforms.

As artificial intelligence becomes more deeply integrated into military operations, the demand for continuous connectivity will increase.

Autonomous and semi-autonomous systems require dependable communications for supervision, coordination, software updates and the transmission of intelligence, even when some functions can operate independently.

This creates a new strategic equation.

The country that controls the communications infrastructure may exercise considerable influence over the technologies connected to it.

Asean cannot afford to treat artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, satellite connectivity and national defence as separate policy domains.

They increasingly constitute one interconnected strategic ecosystem.

The sixth lesson is the need for Asean to develop greater technological resilience through diversified partnerships.

Asean does not need to reproduce Starlink’s enormous satellite constellation. Such an undertaking would be financially demanding and technologically difficult.

Instead, member states should develop interoperable communications architectures that combine terrestrial networks, submarine cables, satellite services and secure national infrastructure.

Partnerships with the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, India and Europe can help expand technological options.

But these partnerships must be managed carefully.

Dependence on a single provider, regardless of nationality, creates the possibility of political leverage and operational disruption.

The seventh lesson is that Asean’s strategic autonomy must evolve beyond traditional diplomatic hedging.

Asean member states have long pursued diversified relationships with competing major powers. This reflects their determination to preserve flexibility in an increasingly contested international environment.

However, diplomatic flexibility becomes insufficient when critical technological systems remain concentrated in the hands of a few external actors.

Asean must become more polytropous: capable of pursuing multiple technological, economic and security relationships simultaneously without surrendering its capacity for independent decision-making.

This requires investment in indigenous expertise, regional research cooperation, cybersecurity and the protection of critical digital infrastructure.

Institutions of higher learning, including IIUM, can contribute through research on artificial intelligence governance, national security studies and the geopolitical implications of emerging technologies.

Asean should also consider developing regional principles governing the use of commercial satellite communications during crises.

Such principles could address service continuity, transparency, contractual safeguards and the responsibilities of private providers whose technologies become essential to national security.

The Asean Outlook on the Indo-Pacific provides a useful diplomatic foundation, especially through its emphasis on cooperation, inclusiveness and regional stability.

Nevertheless, these principles must increasingly be translated into practical technological capabilities.

The Russia–Ukraine war has demonstrated that military power in the twenty-first century is no longer measured simply by the number of soldiers, ships, aircraft or missiles that a country possesses.

It is also determined by the resilience of its communications networks, the security of its data and the independence of the technological systems supporting its national defence.

Starlink initially illustrated how commercial innovation could strengthen a country’s capacity to resist military aggression.

The latest restrictions demonstrate the other side of that equation: technological dependence can expose a country to decisions over which it exercises limited control.

For Asean, the strategic conclusion is unmistakable.

The region must welcome technological innovation without becoming captive to it. It must cultivate international partnerships without allowing these relationships to undermine national sovereignty.

Above all, Asean must recognise that digital sovereignty is becoming inseparable from strategic sovereignty.

In the emerging world disorder, the ability to remain connected during a crisis may prove as important as the ability to defend national territory.

Ukraine has provided a costly lesson. Asean should learn from it before confronting a similar predicament.

The future of regional security will depend not only on who possesses the most advanced technologies, but also on who retains the authority to keep them functioning when they are needed most.

*Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is professor of Asean studies at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) and director of the Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS), while Dr Vic Li Yu Wai is a lecturer at the University of Sheffield, United Kingdom.

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.