How secure is postal voting in Victoria? We decided to find out

With state elections coming up on November 28, you might have wondered: how secure is postal voting in Victoria?

To find out, one of us (Katharina Kretschmer) undertook a research internship at the Victorian Electoral Commission (VEC) between August 2024 and March 2025, with blocks of on-site work during important stages of the 2024 Victorian local government elections. This involved being inducted first as a temporary member of staff and then observing the ballot paper journey and VEC security processes firsthand.

This unprecedented opportunity allowed independent scholars to assess for themselves the integrity of an all-postal election.

Although the VEC provided information when requested, it had no influence over our findings.

Our resulting study, published earlier this year, found current integrity protocols are robust.

In other words, we found the VEC’s postal voting system was safe and secure.

Postal voting: opportunities and vulnerabilities

Postal voting can improve voting accessibility, particularly for rural voters, people with disabilities and expatriates.

Since the COVID pandemic, all Victorian local elections have been conducted entirely by post. This helps maximise safe participation across diverse and geographically dispersed electorates.

However, postal voting has its vulnerabilities.

First, disinformation about postal vote counting and handling is easily spread when the process is less visible to the public.

Second, research from the United States has shown postal voting is susceptible to fraudulent applications for replacement ballots, multiple voting attempts and chain-of-custody breaches. A chain-of-custody breach is when the secure and documented handling of ballot papers is broken. This can include unsecured ballot papers, unauthorised third-party handling, a lack of adequate tracking, and poor storage.

Importantly, our study found no such breaches were detected during the 2024 Victorian local government elections.

What we did

To facilitate secure access to VEC processes, one of us (Kretschmer) was made a temporary member of VEC staff. As an added integrity measure, Kretschmer was accompanied at all times by a permanent VEC staff member.

Throughout this placement, Kretschmer witnessed every major phase of the planning, execution and evaluation of the 2024 local elections.

This allowed her to trace the journey of the ballot at every stage, including:

• receipt and sorting of votes
• removal of ballots from envelopes
• counting
• reconciliation (which is where all physical election materials, from envelopes to ballot papers, are repeatedly checked against administrative records, ensuring that ballot materials are accounted for at all stages), and
• final storage.

Kretschmer had access to internal documents, including manuals, guides, databases and historical election data.

She could also access day-to-day operations across multiple teams and sites. This included the VEC head office, local council election offices, and the central processing sites at the Melbourne Convention and Exhibition Centre and Sandown.

She observed computer counts and preference-distribution procedures, as well as integrity work at head office. This included:

• monitoring result uploads
• comparing election office figures against those in the database.

Kretschmer also learned about perceived challenges to ballot security from vote and count-integrity reviewers and staff dedicated to sorting, counting, reconciliation, informality checks and quality assurance checks.

What we found: robust fraud detection systems

At the 2024 Victorian local council election, the VEC identified suspicious multiple returns. This is when more than one returned ballot pack or declaration envelope is linked to the same elector.

This initially included 128 such returns in Whittlesea City Council’s Lalor Ward and 61 in Knox City Council’s Baird Ward.

Without compromising ballot secrecy, the VEC is able to identify these cases by checking returned declaration envelopes against voter records before the actual ballot is removed. Replacement and other potentially duplicate returns are also held for additional checks, including signature matching.

These checks are designed to ensure only one genuine vote per voter is admitted to the count. Samples of voter signatures are audited as an additional integrity measure.

The VEC referred patterns of suspicious returns in Lalor and Baird to law enforcement and electoral oversight bodies, including Victoria Police and the Local Government Inspectorate (an independent agency that ensures Victorian councils follow the Local Government Act 2020).

The VEC also applied to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal for review of both results.

The tribunal later voided the Lalor Ward result because the 39-vote margin meant that the interference could have affected the outcome. The tribunal upheld the validity of the Baird Ward result because the number of fraudulent votes was too small to affect the result.

Another investigation centring on Merri-bek council in 2020 ended with a man being convicted for vote tampering.

The VEC’s internal safeguard measures – including signature comparison, ballot tracking, or checking reconciliation anomalies – help detect fraudulent ballots.

A strong system – and two recommendations

Overall, we found the VEC’s postal voting system features a robust, highly structured set of procedures.

These procedures ensure ballots are securely handled, accurately counted, and appropriately safeguarded.

We found that they aligned with – and often exceeded – international standards.

At the same time, two potential vulnerabilities remain. Voters have no reliable way to check where their requested replacement ballot is (for instance, whether the VEC is still processing the request or has already mailed it). This can lead some electors to request another. Also, the VEC relies on a large and unevenly experienced casual workforce.

Both represent actual risk and affect public perception of electoral integrity.

Although addressing these vulnerabilities would require funding and, in some cases, legislative change, these investments could yield significant returns in terms of public trust.