Trump is now 0 for 10 with his gifts to Putin
Just as U.S. envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff arrived in Moscow on Nov. 12 to speak with Russian President Vladimir Putin about Ukraine, the U.S. delivered a gift as valuable as anything they were about to say. The SpaceX Starshield modules that enable Ukrainian interceptors to bring down Russia’s jet-powered drones suddenly had their speeds limited, severely weakening Ukrainian defenses.
It’s hard to be sure whether the throttling of Elon Musk’s satellite system was related to the Americans’ visit or to Ukraine’s bombing of Russian’s oil refineries. Whatever the motive, it was a boon to the Kremlin that, as with a similar speed-reduction episode last month, will cost Ukrainian lives while creating opportunities for Russia’s forces.
Nobody should be surprised. It was just the latest in a string of at least 10 offerings the Trump administration has made to Putin since the U.S. president returned to office. It is their cumulative effect that underlies the deep suspicion with which Kyiv and European capitals alike view Washington’s push for a new “big, beautiful agreement” to end the war.
It’s worth recalling the history of this gifting and what the U.S. has received in return, which is zero. This unrequited generosity is highly unusual for an obsessively transactional administration and it has no adequate explanation. For why would America want to help the world’s largest nuclear-armed autocracy destroy a fellow sovereign democracy that gave up its own nuclear arsenal in exchange for U.S. security guarantees, unless there was an overriding national interest to be served? Why would it choose to encourage the commission of war crimes and undermine the security of U.S. treaty allies?
Donald Trump’s answer to those questions — that he just wants to stop the bloodshed — doesn’t stack up, not least because his concessions to Moscow keep increasing it.
The first and biggest gift came with Trump’s re-election. Under the Biden administration, the U.S. had allocated a total of €115 billion ($119 billion at the time) in military and other aid to Ukraine, according to the Ukraine Support Tracker from Germany’s Kiel Institute for World Affairs. That’s the most accurate accounting of what’s actually been delivered, as opposed to Trump’s wildly inflated estimates, and it hasn’t increased since he moved back into the White House in January 2025.
It’s easy to forget how big a win this aid freeze has been for the Kremlin. What U.S. help remains — the sharing of intelligence with Ukraine’s armed forces and purchases of critical U.S. weapons by other allies — is the result of a scramble by Ukrainian and European leaders, as they tried to salvage something from the wreckage two years ago.
Within days of being sworn in, Trump and his new defense secretary had also ruled out any possibility of Ukraine joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This handed Putin the concession he claimed to have gone to war for, before ceasefire negotiations had even begun. It was a strange move for a man who wrote “The Art of the Deal” — and the second major freebee. Against that backdrop, as Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says Kushner and Witkoff offered NATO membership if he gives up the so-called fortress belt of cities in the Donbas, there’s cause for skepticism as to how much protection this would actually offer.
The third major gift came in March 2025, when the U.S. cut off intelligence sharing with Kyiv. This occurred just as Moscow’s forces were gathering to retake a small piece of territory near Kursk, which it had lost in a surprise Ukrainian attack seven months earlier. The aim of Zelenskyy and his generals had been to pin down Russian troops that otherwise would be sent to fight in Ukraine, while at the same time holding some territory to use as a bargaining chip. Suddenly fighting blind, the Ukrainians had to retreat across the border, losing their Russian foothold and their chip.
Trump was at the same time parroting Russian propaganda. He accused Kyiv of being responsible for its own invasion, ambushed Zelenskyy on camera in the Oval Office and called for his replacement through logistically impossible wartime elections that could serve only to produce Kyiv’s political destabilization.
In August that year, Trump invited Putin, wanted for trial on alleged war crimes by the International Criminal Court, to Alaska for a red-carpet summit. The Kremlin had hoodwinked Witkoff, a real estate developer learning diplomacy on the hoof, into believing that it was ready to negotiate, but it wasn’t. The meeting in Anchorage was a bust and has allowed the Russians to appeal ever since to a nonexistent deal they allege they were offered. Take all this legitimization of Putin and delegitimization of Zelenskyy as a fourth present.
To attack Iran was a fifth. This was by no means undertaken to harm Ukraine, but the benefits to Moscow have been profound. It led to Trump easing sanctions on Russian oil exports, in particular diesel. Still more important was Trump’s pressuring of Zelenskyy to stop destroying Russia’s oil refineries — the Ukrainian leader’s best tool for bringing the war’s cost home to ordinary Russians. The Iran war also burned through U.S. stocks of critical missiles and Patriot interceptors that are now unavailable for sale to Ukraine.
Gifts six and seven were close behind, the two episodes mentioned earlier in which Starshield, Starlink’s military application, reduced the speeds at which Ukraine’s guided interceptor drones could operate. This was likely done with the full knowledge and approval of the White House, which denied it, and added jet-propelled, Shahed-style loitering munitions to the list of Russian missiles against which Kyiv has little defense.
A second instance of shutting off intelligence — in this case early warnings of incoming Russian missiles — came last month and counts as gift number eight. Again, it meant more Ukrainian deaths, including civilians, while abetting Russian attacks on the power grids, water pumps and central heating stations that make life in Ukraine’s cities possible.
Most recently, U.S. negotiators accepted Russia’s insistent demand that talks about a new security structure for Europe should precede any ceasefire in Ukraine. That wider discussion needs to come at some point, but as the popular Russian war blogger Alexander Kots pointed out, the sequencing means that Ukraine has now lost “the main battle” over the order of talks. “So we build a new security architecture and keep fighting until the Spring. Then there will new negotiations, on even worse terms for Ukraine.” A ninth gift to Russia.
Finally, all this has happened as Trump casts doubt on the U.S. commitment to NATO’s collective defense. The uncertainty this has stirred up is his 10th gift to Russia, as it has piled pressure on European nations to panic-spend and hoard their defenses. And that’s as Trump also forces them to double their financial support for Ukraine in order to fill the void he created.
It looks as though the gifts will keep coming. It was the Kremlin that lobbied tirelessly for the trilateral Putin-Trump-Xi Jinping summit in Shenzhen, China. Putin has been seeking both recognition as a fellow superpower and agreement from the other two to carve up the world into spheres of influence, similar to what Josef Stalin achieved with Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt at Yalta, in 1945.
Putin has made no concessions toward a peace deal in exchange. Nor has anything yet materialized from the parallel bilateral negotiations over a supposed $12 trillion worth of U.S.-Russia commercial deals. It is hard to overstate the scale of this win for him.
The White House line is that conciliation is what it takes to be a successful mediator. But if that’s the strategy, it is unfathomably naive and has already failed abysmally and repeatedly. Should that failure become complete, it would constitute the ultimate gift to Putin: a victory in Ukraine that he could not have otherwise achieved.
Marc Champion is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Europe, Russia and the Middle East.
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