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Is the Islamic Republic of Iran afraid of Reza Pahlavi? - analysis

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When millions of Iranians took to the streets in January, one name repeatedly rang out among protesters: Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi.

Some outside the country were quick to dismiss the exiled royal, son of the former shah Mohammad Reza, as incapable of leading the protests against the Islamic Republic from afar, or questioned his suitability to be an alternative leader to the mullahs in Tehran.

US President Donald Trump offered his own opinion in the war between Israel, Iran, and the US earlier this year, questioning whether Pahlavi was the man to lead a post-regime Iran. And many others have opined on the prince’s ability to shape events far from a country he has not set foot in for over four decades.

 But there is one major player that, even months later, appears concerned about Pahlavi’s standing among ordinary Iranians and the impact he may have on the future of the regime.

 Iranian state and regime-aligned media have repeatedly attacked Pahlavi’s ability to mobilize people inside Iran, questioned whether he can unite the opposition, sought to undermine his standing among ethnic and religious minorities, and accused him of exploiting questions of Iranian sovereignty for political gain. At the same time, Tehran’s judiciary has issued a sweeping indictment accusing him of security, terrorism and espionage offenses, while senior figures within the security establishment continue to portray January’s uprising as part of a wider foreign attempt to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

A person holds a picture of exiled Iranian Prince Reza Pahlavi, during a protest against the Iranian regime at the Peace Palace ahead of a NATO leaders' summit in The Hague, Netherlands June 21, 2025.
A person holds a picture of exiled Iranian Prince Reza Pahlavi, during a protest against the Iranian regime at the Peace Palace ahead of a NATO leaders' summit in The Hague, Netherlands June 21, 2025. (credit: PIROSCHKA VAN DE WOUW/REUTERS)

Iranian regime trying to squash Pahlavi support within Iran

While questions in the diaspora can be raised about how much support Pahlavi actually enjoys inside Iran (although January’s protests provided considerable evidence of support for him in parts of the country), Iran’s regime is devoting considerable attention to ensuring he does not gain more.

The campaign has been particularly visible during August.

On August 15, the IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency published a lengthy attack under the headline, “Rewriting a failure; Reza Pahlavi changes colors again!”, accusing the exiled prince of attempting to rewrite his role during the January uprising.

Tasnim disputed Pahlavi’s account of the calls he made around January 8 and 9, accused him of seeking to escape responsibility for bloodshed, and then claimed he was attempting to portray himself as a leader for whom “protecting people’s lives” was paramount.
The news agency also said Pahlavi was trying to rebuild his “image and political capital” to prepare the ground for “future calls” to action. It then declared that Iranians did not consider him worth “a penny” and claimed nobody had paid attention to his previous appeals.

Pahlavi had indeed told Iranians in his January call that their response to demonstrations on January 8 and 9 would determine the “next calls to action” he would issue.

The following day, the agency promoted remarks by Ramin Piramoun, identified as a former Pahlavi adviser, under the headline: “The factor dividing the opposition is Reza Pahlavi.”

“Unfortunately, one of the problems preventing opposition unity is Reza Pahlavi himself,” Piramoun said, adding that many people in southern Iran did not believe in the Pahlavi family and did not accept him.

Fars News Agency, which has links to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has pursued a similar line from several directions.

When Pahlavi entered the recent debate over the legal status of the Caspian Sea, Fars accused him of opportunistically presenting himself as the defender of Iran’s territorial integrity. In an article from August 10, headlined “The convention that loosened Reza Pahlavi’s tongue,” the agency attacked what it called his “fake nationalism.”

Then, on Friday, Fars seized on criticism of Pahlavi from the Sunni-oriented Kalemeh television network.

One presenter, Ebrahim Ahrari, was quoted saying that Pahlavi had failed to establish relationships with political groups and had become “an agent of division,” adding that the Sunni community and its leaders had not accepted him. Fars turned the comments into another story questioning Pahlavi’s ability to build support across Iran’s religious and social divisions.

State television has also been seen in the campaign. In a recent segment on IRIB’s Ofogh network, presenter Nader Sohrabi accused Pahlavi of “wave-riding” on public anger, saying that “protests in Iran have always existed” before adding, “until Reza Pahlavi’s wave-riding began.”Even while acknowledging that Iranians had genuine reasons to protest, state television sought to separate that unrest from Pahlavi and portray him as exploiting it.

It is important to point out that some of those criticisms are not confined solely to regime media. Pahlavi has also faced questions from former supporters and other opposition figures over his ability to unite Iran’s fractured opposition, while analysts have pointed to continuing tensions with some ethnic minority groups. The significance here is that Tehran has repeatedly chosen to amplify precisely those vulnerabilities.

Terhan prosecutors announce an indictment against Pahlavi

The anti-Pahlavi campaign is not confined to Iran’s state media; it has also played a role within the judiciary.

In July, Tehran prosecutors announced that an indictment against Pahlavi had been issued, including on charges of efsad fel-arz, or “corruption on earth,” through the alleged formation and direction of organized groups against state security; directing terrorist and violent activities; cooperation with hostile governments during conflict; espionage and intelligence cooperation with foreign services; incitement to violence; responsibility for destruction of public and private property; and propaganda against the Islamic Republic.

These remain accusations made by the Islamic Republic against one of its most prominent opponents and should be treated as such. But the scale of the charges shows how Iran’s leaders have chosen to treat a man who has spent most of his life outside Iran as a national-security threat.

Has he gotten under their skin?

 Mohsen Rezaei, the veteran former IRGC commander recently returned to the center of Iranian decision-making as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, has described January’s uprising as a foreign-designed “coup,” arguing that after Israel and the United States failed to achieve their aims through war, they turned to internal destabilization and a strategy of breaking Iran apart “piece by piece.” Rezaei did not directly say that Pahlavi himself intended to divide Iran, but his remarks show a wider security narrative in which domestic unrest is being propelled by Israel and the United States. The same narrative has appeared in cases brought against January protesters, including defendants accused of links to Israel or the United States.

Pahlavi occupies a prominent place in the regime’s narrative here. He called for coordinated action in January, has appealed to security forces to defect, maintains close ties with Israel, and has presented himself as prepared to play a leading role in a post-Islamic Republic transition.

Pahlavi could rally those seeking to bring down the regime

For the Islamic Republic, Pahlavi’s potential threat lies in his being a recognizable opposition figure around whom people already seeking the end of the existing system might coalesce. Monarchists already see him as their natural leader, while his wider political project has increasingly focused on persuading republicans, minorities and other opposition currents that they could work together during a transition without first agreeing on Iran’s eventual system of government.

 The Islamic Republic’s media have worked to portray Pahlavi as responsible for failure and bloodshed, incapable of bringing the opposition together, rejected by parts of Iranian society, and unqualified to claim the mantle of Iranian nationalism.

Does that mean Iran’s regime is afraid of Reza Pahlavi?

Perhaps the point is that, seven months after January, Tehran still appears to believe that convincing Iranians not to follow him is worth the effort.

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