Rupert Hammond-Chambers On Taiwan: America’s Bipartisan Support for Taiwan Remains the Bedrock for Enduring Ties

When big events happen, it is natural to feel a degree of unease about what it may mean to us personally and to our interests more broadly. So, for those embedded in US-Taiwan ties, the recent “blue wave” that broke over the US on Nov. 3 would naturally engender myriad questions about its effect on American support for Taiwan.

America’s Democratic Party secured victories in traditional strongholds as well as in areas such as Texas, traditionally associated with Republican governance. The election results have been viewed as a significant repudiation of US President Donald Trump’s nearly two years in office and his inability to get his administration’s arms around important issues, particularly affordability. This was a central issue that helped Trump return to office just two years ago, yet American voters are still waiting for their elected leadership to effectively respond. The timing of the kinetic conflict with Iran, which spiked energy prices, simply pumped fuel on the fire.

The arrival of many new Democratic Party faces in state and national offices is an opportunity and shouldn’t be seen as an insurmountable barrier to continued bipartisan support. On the contrary, many of the party’s incoming legislators are likely to be predisposed to honoring legacy ties while seeking to advance the partnership.

At a local level, Taiwan has seen rapid growth in the opening of US state offices. As recently as 2023, only six states had offices in Taiwan; by the autumn of 2025, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) noted 26 state and territorial offices. That’s quite a spike in attention. The fact is that Taiwan’s economic importance to the US has grown rapidly of late, including through increased Taiwanese investment in the US. States are likely to continue competing for Taiwanese investment, including Taiwan’s commitment in its Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART), consummated earlier this year, which calls for cooperation to establish industrial parks around the country, among other commitments. We’ve seen recent media coverage of Arizona and Texas, as well as the possibility of a park in the Midwest to base investment in the development and production of unmanned systems. State and local officials will continue to visit Taiwan frequently — Arizona sent over 100 representatives to SEMICON Taiwan in September alone.

According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), Taiwan’s approved investment in the US from 2021 to 2025 totaled US$30.5 billion. That’s over a fifth of Taiwan’s total outbound investment, and the numbers continue to rise. Arizona is the greatest beneficiary of future inbound investment, as TSMC’s Phoenix campus already has in excess of US$200 billion in committed capital, much still to be deployed. Hence, Arizona has sent large delegations of officials to promote further investment by Taiwanese companies that cluster around TSMC’s fabs, shortening supply chains, improving efficiency and therefore increasing profitability. Many other states are replicating this approach, and their efforts will be led by newly elected officials.

New faces won’t just hail from local politics: the House of Representatives and the Senate will also welcome new and important voices. Some of these politicians already have national profiles and will seek to establish themselves as respected voices on issues that are important to their party and their state. We have lost important voices on Taiwan in the past year. Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina passed away this past summer, a consistent voice of support for bilateral ties, particularly in defense, with the island’s F-16s being built in his state. Another influential voice, former senator Jay Rockefeller, passed away just this month. His leadership on Taiwan issues in the Senate had few peers during his time in office. We mourn the loss of these leaders from each side of the aisle, but should be comforted by the fact that their legacy is ably supplanted by senators such as Tillis, Slotkin, Duckworth and Sullivan. So the House, too, shows considerable leadership, with legislative efforts emanating from both sides of the aisle, and leadership from the likes of Diaz-Balart, Barr, Stanton and Bera. The House is likely to remain a stalwart of support for bilateral ties. As noted in my previous column (Rupert Hammond-Chambers On Taiwan: The Fourth Taiwan Arms-Sale Freeze, Sept. 21, page 8), the ongoing hold on a pending arms-sales package is deeply unhelpful in the broader effort to equip Taiwan with the weapons it needs to deter an attack by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The ramifications are both material and political. The next Congress would be well served by using its relevant committees to hold hearings on where the security relationship stands and how extended delays affect Taiwanese and American military readiness. Such hearings would also prove useful in highlighting the importance of Taiwan as the US moves towards its next presidential election cycle.

Taiwan’s economic importance to the US is deeply embedded in its role as America’s primary supplier of high-end semiconductor chips, AI-related hardware and electronics. AI infrastructure was an issue in many elections across the US, and there are genuine concerns, including high energy use. That said, there was considerable misinformation in these debates, resulting in outcomes that could inhibit America’s ability to compete with China in this critical area, for example the nonsense that data centers can consume excessive water, thereby threatening access to local supplies. How will the issue play out as we migrate from electioneering to governance? US-Taiwan commercial ties are linked to America’s willingness to compete with China in the area of AI, and this will require an honest debate that balances resource demands against the importance of maintaining a competitive industry.

Finally, the isolationist wings of both parties continue to metastasize, and it is unclear how much power they will wield in the coming two years. Republican willingness to support Trump’s policies has resulted in growth in the party’s isolationist wing, and we’ll need to watch closely how emerging Republican candidates for the 2028 presidential election position themselves, as that could affect support for Taiwan. On the Democrat side, the centrality of progressives and the increasingly prominent Democratic Socialists of America bear close watching as they seek to shape the incoming Congress’s agenda and play a leading role in tapping the Democratic presidential candidate for 2028. Their attitudes towards defense spending, technology infrastructure, competition and commercial competitiveness could create headwinds for bilateral ties with Taiwan.

American democracy is incredibly robust, as we’ve seen in the past several election cycles. I believe the history of bilateral ties, strong bipartisan support and economic interdependence will combine to ensure that the incoming US Congress will be strongly supportive of US-Taiwan relations. That said, both parties have political wings that raise concerns about the parties’ ability to remain focused on the threat posed by the CCP, including as it relates to Taiwan.

Rupert Hammond-Chambers is the president of the US-Taiwan Business Council (USTBC), a senior advisor at Bower Group Asia and sits on the board of the Institute for Indo-Pacific Security.