Rethinking Taiwan’s cyberstrategy

The Ministry of National Defense has proposed establishing a military cyberhunt team and allocated NT$95.93 million (US$3.01 million) for the plan. This is a doctrinal revolution and an inflection point in Taiwan’s national security architecture. It is Taiwan’s first explicit shift from Cold War-style passive perimeter defense to US-aligned “persistent engagement” and intelligence driven cyberoperations.

However, Taiwan’s attempt at a strategic leap and execution of a world-class threat-hunting strategy could potentially be strangled by a shoestring budget and a legal firewall that isolates military hunt teams from important civilian infrastructure.

For many years, the cyberdefense of Taiwan’s military was based on perimeter defense, which is reactive in nature. In strategic terms, the approach is called “passive defense by denial.”

Unfortunately, the era of modern digital warfare is incompatible with static defense strategies. Advanced persistent threats that have been backed by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are not air raids carried out during peacetime. Modern campaigns such as the Volt Typhoon state-sponsored cyberthreat actor represent less noisy campaigns aimed at gathering intelligence and maintaining an inactive presence in systems for months or years until hour zero of a conflict.

The new Information, Communications and Electronic Force Command training strategy rests upon a different idea of already having a functioning threat in place. The proactive approach allows Taiwan to put its military practice in accordance with the US Cyber Command’s 2018 concept of “persistent engagement” and “defend forward.”

The transition might seem politically delicate. Embracing the “Assume Breach” strategy means acknowledging that Chinese threats are already hiding inside domestic servers. By allowing the command’s hunting units to act as “digital scavengers” in peacetime, Taiwan wants to prevent Beijing from using its digital launching pads even before kinetic strikes are ordered.

In addition to national military reform, the primary concern of the command’s contribution is its capacity to enhance the construction of alliance subdiplomacy. The project indicates that the initiative will allow foreign, mainly American, trainers to visit Taiwan as part of a simulation similar to the Cyber Flag military drills.

This is cyberinteroperability in practice. While in regular warfare the integration of alliances requires common hardware, joint training and unified control, in cyberwarfare that is achieved through agreements on tactics, techniques and procedures, uniform threat telemetry and common defense strategies. Just like NATO allies, by educating Taiwanese personnel in line with Cyber Flag exercises, Taiwan and the US are establishing operation synchrony, but without formal treaties.

That establishes a strong deterrent mechanism through unity. If Taiwanese cybersecurity specialists use techniques approved by US and cooperative intelligence systems, any Chinese cyberattacks planned against Taiwanese C2 systems run a high risk of being tracked by the US.

Washington’s engagement in Taipei’s cybersecurity system creates a high geopolitical price for Beijing.

However, there are two potential contradictions behind this revolutionary doctrine:

First, it is important to analyze the financial investment into the project. Taiwan has proposed a record national defense budget of NT$1.1225 trillion for fiscal 2027, with the share of military spending to be 3.01 percent of GDP. The allocation of NT$95.93 million by the command is just 0.0085 percent of the total defense spending of the country. The budget of this new elite cyberteam is smaller than the price of a single engine part of an F-16V jet. On the other hand, China is spending billions on its Strategic Support Force, cyberunits, state-sponsored hacking groups and offensive artificial intelligence (AI) research.

The financial gap shows a significant weakness. Threat hunting is one the most demanding and labor intensive areas in cyberspace. It requires specialists in reverse engineering, kernel exploitation, threat intelligence and related fields. If Taiwan wants to make “perpetual engagement” a key aspect in its digital asymmetric defense, the Legislative Yuan must make cybercapabilities an investment priority.

Second, even after the budget concerns are addressed and operational synergy is achieved with US forces, there is still one major structural problem: The initiative has too little jurisdiction.

The ministry’s cyberhunting group is meant to protect the networks and command channels of the military, but that makes little sense, as “gray zone” aggression does not pay attention to such boundaries. The PLA will not delay in striking Taiwan Power Co’s SCADA systems, undersea cable landing stations, water management systems, banks and semiconductor supply chains. The goal of cybersabotage is to create chaos among civilians and disrupt internal logistics, leaving the leadership of the country disconnected.

Last month, Taiwan faced several waves of AI-driven cyberattacks that targeted civilian agencies rather than military networks. That shows an institutional crisis, as the Ministry of Digital Affairs is responsible for civilian cyberissues while the defense ministry operates in the military sector. The specific command structure leaves the civilian system, which is essential for whole-of-society resilience, unprotected.

Taiwan’s implementation of a “persistent engagement” strategy is an essential and overdue move in long-term military strategy. To transform this initiative into a true digital shield, the Executive Yuan needs to gradually increase the budget for cyberdefense, making it a key domain of warfare. A legal mechanism should be established to let military hunt teams conduct joint operations with critical civilian infrastructure.

Moreover, Cyber Flag-type exercises should be held annually in the framework of Taiwan-US cybercooperation.

Cyberspace is not an exception. It is the front line of 21st-century informational warfare and Taiwan has taken the first step to secure it in a long-lasting battle.

Akankshya Ray is a doctoral student in the College of Social Sciences’ International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University. She holds a master’s degree in conflict analysis and peacebuilding.