‘Main culprits,’ ignored complaints, and needed reforms: Takeaways from the independent probe into the Tai Po fire

Almost a year after a deadly blaze killed 168 people and left thousands homeless at Tai Po’s Wang Fuk Court, an independent inquiry has produced a comprehensive report into the tragedy, identifying the “culprits,” making wide-ranging recommendations, and mourning the lives lost.

The two-volume report, spanning more than 1,000 pages, details the findings from an independent committee’s 30 days of hearings held between March and July, as well as recommendations to overhaul shortcomings in the city’s building maintenance regime and fire safety regulations.

Announcing sweeping reforms following the release of the report at a press conference last month, Chief Executive John Lee led top administration officials in an apology to victims and the public, marking the government’s first such gesture since the fatal fire.

Most of the report is accessible to the public, except for some 41 pages that have been partially redacted to avoid prejudicing ongoing criminal proceedings.

HKFP shares some of the takeaways from the report.

Contractor and consultant ‘the main culprits’

The two firms that oversaw the renovation works at Wang Fuk Court, contractor Prestige Construction & Engineering and project consultant Will Power Architects, had “overall responsibility” for the works at the estate, according to the report.

“There is no doubt that they are the main culprits responsible for the occurrence of the inferno and the high fatalities in the tragic incident,” it said.

Prestige’s use of non-fire-retardant materials, including scaffolding netting and foam boards, as well as its removal of fireproof windows from fire escapes, went unchecked by Will Power, which was tasked with acting as an independent supervisor.

Indeed, the two firms were in cahoots from the beginning, when Will Power falsely submitted that Prestige had faced no prosecution over its safety record and awarded the contractor full marks when evaluating contractor bids.

The report names individuals responsible for the two companies’ operations: Prestige proprietor Hau Wa-kin, project manager Gordon Ho, and Will Power proprietor Jason Wong.

The report also singles out Wilson Ng, the registered inspector for the works at Wang Fuk Court who was meant to be a gatekeeper but acted “only as a ‘dummy’ rubber-stamping the supervisory works.”

He was among those who “conducted no substantive work and were only asked to lend their names to rubber-stamp statutory forms in return for a fee,” the report said.

His WhatsApp messages indicated that he accepted a HK$180,000 offer to sign “whatever documents were put before him,” for the Wang Fuk Court project and other works. “Such irresponsible conduct on the part of Mr Ng is simply appalling and unacceptable,” the committee said.

Gain Profit and China Status, the two firms hired by Prestige to procure scaffolding netting and apply to shut down the estate’s fire safety systems, respectively, were said to be “equally culpable” for the fire.

Regulators ‘failed in their supervisory duties’

During the press conference in which Lee publicised the reforms last month, he also announced that Secretary for Housing Winnie Ho would be stepping down.

Ho led the Housing Bureau, which oversees the disgraced Independent Checking Unit (ICU). The unit pre-announced its inspections, which allowed Prestige to prepare compliant samples in place of the actual substandard materials, and failed to meaningfully follow up on residents’ complaints.

That, in effect, allowed “systemic” failures to persist, the report found.

According to the report, the unit “blindly” followed the rules and procedures set by the Buildings Department (BD), which falls under the Development Bureau.

The inquiry said that the BD and the ICU, as the two government bodies “primarily responsible” for supervising the works at Wang Fuk Court, “had failed in their supervisory duties” in ensuring safety. Between the two, the ICU should “bear a greater share of responsibility,” it said.

The two departments’ failings “can be summarised as a… lack of sense of crisis, regulatory lapses, systemic blind spots, and enforcement failures,” the report said.

As for the Fire Services Department (FSD), the committee said it had adopted a “self-imposed limitation on its role in abating fire hazards,” despite having a “concurrent duty” as stipulated by a legal precedent to handle fire safety issues alongside other departments.

Its failure to notice at least two life-threatening fire hazards – the disabled fire alarms and the fire escape window openings – “contributed to the catastrophic loss of life at Wang Fuk Court.”

The Labour Department (LD), meanwhile, should bear “lesser responsibility” for the fire compared to the BD, ICU, and FSD, the committee said, given that it is mainly responsible for occupational safety issues on worksites.

However, it “should have known that they were the final gate-keeper” on the issue of construction workers smoking, the committee said.

Some names cleared

Then-District Councillor Peggy Wong’s role at Wang Fuk Court was closely watched. But the evidence presented to the inquiry was insufficient to prove Wong was involved in bid-rigging at the Tai Po housing estate, according to the report.

The report also clears the estate’s owners’ board of responsibility, saying that those on the management committee “are only homeowners elected by others to represent them in running the affairs of the buildings.”

“Imposing unrealistic and onerous duty on the members of the [management committee] making them accountable for something which are quite beyond their control or expertise would simply discourage homeowners from taking part in running the affairs of their own buildings, which may not be desirable in overall management of the buildings,” it said.

180 complaints and enquiries

The contractor’s legitimacy, workers smoking, blocked fire escapes, and the use of foam boards were all the subjects of complaints and enquiries submitted to government departments in the lead-up to the tragedy.

While the fact that residents had made complaints was revealed in the hearing, the report for the first time showed the magnitude of dissatisfaction and the widespread awareness that the maintenance work was not in compliance with regulations.

A table in the report’s annex showed that 180 complaints and enquiries were made to government departments ahead of the Tai Po fire. They included the ICU, the Home Affairs Department (HAD), the FSD, the LD and the BD.

After Prestige was chosen as the main contractor during a meeting in January 2024 following a vote, complaints were made to the BD and the HAD about the selection. Concerns were also raised about their past conviction records.

When the renovation works began, residents filed numerous complaints about workers smoking, with some providing photographic and video evidence.

Blocked escape routes were also a subject of complaints, with 10 such complaints made to the FSD.

The locations raised were in Wang Chi House, Wang Kin House, Wang Shing House, and Wang Yan House. In particular, three complainants expressed concern about one location – outside a fourth-floor unit in Wang Chi House.

A total of 10 complaints were made about the use of foam boards, most of them to the FSD. Four were made about the safety of the scaffolding protective nets.

Safety concerns ignored

The report states that there was evidence of a “large volume of complaints” from residents to various government bodies, but departments frequently responded that the issues fell outside their purview.

There were four known complaints to the ICU regarding the use of foam boards to cover windows, the first made in mid-September 2024. In response, the ICU stated that it was in contact with Will Power and the registered inspector employed to oversee the project.

Following another complaint the next month, the ICU referred the matter to the LD and directed Will Power and the registered inspector to “take immediate action and conduct a site safety assessment.” Although the ICU also conducted a follow-up site inspection, foam boards continued to be used.

The FSD, in response to enquiries and complaints about foam boards, said there were no specific regulations on window coverings. It also referred complainants to the ICU and the BD.

Regarding complaints over workers smoking, the LD conducted 16 site inspections, but officers reported finding no evidence of smoking, concluding the complaints were “not justified.”

In response to another complaint about scaffolding nets, the LD said it referred the matter to the relevant departments, and that it had also checked the certificate of the nets showing it was in compliance with fire retardant standards.

Regarding complaints concerning the selection of Prestige and its past record, the BD maintained that the matter fell outside its purview.

One of the complaints was referred to the BD by the HAD. The BD then told the complainant to approach the ICU.

“Instead of working together to solve the problem concerned, the facts in the present case show that the different departments just ‘passed the ball’ to the others,” the report read.

“Most unfortunately, what happened afterwards shows that the residents were right about their complaints,” it added.

High-level committee to see through reforms

The independent committee has made 120 recommendations in the report, covering loopholes in the city’s fire safety regulations and deficiencies in government oversight exposed in the deadly blaze.

The government implemented several remedial measures ahead of the report’s release, including a blanket ban on smoking at construction sites. It has also pledged to introduce necessary reviews and to amend legislation regarding the city’s building maintenance regime.

To oversee the wide-ranging reforms, the independent committee recommended that the government establish a high-level steering committee to monitor the implementation and effectiveness of the measures.

Lee said last month that a steering committee, which will be chaired by Chief Secretary Eric Chan, the city’s number two official, will supervise how various government departments and agencies implement the recommendations

Chan said during a radio programme that the committee would convene a meeting as early as December, adding that he believed most recommendations could be implemented “within a few months.”

999 call failures ‘individual incidents’

During the independent committee’s evidential hearings, the question of whether 999 operators mishandled emergency calls from residents trapped inside the blaze attracted public attention.

One call, made by an elderly woman on the 17th floor of Wang Cheong House minutes after the blaze broke out, was never transferred to the Fire Services Department, the committee heard. This breached a core 999 operational protocol requiring all emergency calls regarding fire hazards to be routed to the FSD for follow-up.

The inquiry heard that the 999 operator asked the woman whether she “required assistance” from firefighters. When she hesitated, the operator told her to call back if she needed help. She later died in the blaze.

It was also revealed that, in another 999 call made by a teacher at 9.22 pm – at that time the blaze had already engulfed multiple blocks – the caller said the grandfather of one of his students could not be contacted. The elderly man lived in Wang Shing House.

Again, the call was not transferred to the FSD, and records showed that firefighters only learned about this missing person about an hour later based on information at the scene. The body of an elderly man was discovered inside the reported unit the next day.

“The Committee does not know whether the transfer of such calls would have resulted in the successful rescue of the elderly lady and the elderly man, but it would certainly have increased their chance of survival,” the report read.

However, the committee did not find systemic issues in the 999 operational protocol that warranted reforms.

“Since there is an established protocol for the transfer of the calls and the call operators should have been properly trained, the Committee has reasons to believe that the non-transference of the calls were individual incidents caused by the oversight on the part of the relevant 999 Operators,” it said.

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