Appraising the security challenges in the North-West, By Samuel Aruwan

Last week, yours sincerely was in Gusau, Zamfara State, as one of the panelists and resource persons at the North-West Security Summit, themed “Appraising the Security Challenges in the North-West,” at the instance of the Inspector General of Police, Olatunji Disu.

It was a week of thorough deliberations and deep reflections. It also afforded one the opportunity to sneak out to frontline areas for an assessment and to visit the Theatre Command Headquarters of the Joint Task Force, Operation Fansan Yamma (OPFY), under the command of Major General WB Idris.

Some of us arrived on Monday and Tuesday ahead of the full commencement of the event. On the opening day, the Governor of Zamfara State, Dauda Lawal, was on hand with his entourage. The Emir of Zamfara and Chairman of the Zamfara State Council of Emirs, Alhaji Attahiru Muhammad Ahmad, stood in for the Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Muhammad Sa’ad Abubakar III, and led the other monarchs. AVM Bashir Saidu Gamagira (rtd), the Wakilin Soron Zazzau, represented the Emir of Zazzau, Ambassador Ahmad Nuhu Bamali. Also present were Commissioners of Police, military commanders and a pool of resource persons.

The Inspector General of Police, IGP Disu, started the day with a thought-provoking remark: “The security of the North-West is a collective responsibility and we are prepared to confront its challenges collectively. The North-West remains a region of enormous human, economic and cultural importance to Nigeria. It is home to millions of Nigerians, a region of rich traditions, vast agricultural potential, important commercial corridors and some of our most revered traditional institutions.”

Disu further said: “Yet, the region continues to confront serious security challenges, particularly banditry, kidnapping, arms proliferation, communal and ethnic conflicts, farmer-herder tensions, violent criminality and other forms of insecurity which threaten lives, livelihoods, economic activity and social cohesion. These challenges are serious. But they are not insurmountable.”

On what should be done, the IGP asserted: “What is required is not simply a multiplication of security operations. What is required is a coherent, sustained and intelligence-driven regional response, supported by political will, strong institutions, community participation and genuine collaboration among all stakeholders. This is the essence of this summit.

“Distinguished guests, our experience has taught us one fundamental lesson: no single security agency can secure the North-West alone. The police cannot do it alone. The military cannot do it alone. The intelligence agencies cannot do it alone. State governments cannot do it alone. Traditional institutions cannot do it alone. And, importantly, the communities themselves cannot be excluded from the security architecture.”

Before returning the microphone to Governor Lawal, the IGP bemoaned ethnic profiling and labelling, which he described as a setback to the campaign against banditry. He argued: “We must also be very careful about how we define the problem before us. Criminality has no ethnicity and terrorism has no religion. We must resist the temptation to collectively label communities or ethnic groups because of the criminal conduct of individuals. Such profiling does not help security operations; rather, it creates mistrust, deepens divisions and can ultimately provide criminals with the environment they need to thrive.”

Governor Lawal, in his remarks, said: “The security crisis confronting the North-West has evolved beyond isolated incidents of criminality. Banditry, kidnapping for ransom, cattle rustling and other organised criminal activities have developed networks that operate across state boundaries, exploit difficult terrain, and threaten rural livelihoods, food security, education, investment and social cohesion. The summit document also rightly identifies emerging urban threats, including local thuggery, substance abuse and the infiltration of radical groups.”

One quite agreed with the governor’s position, considering the use of improvised explosive devices buried by bandits along routes used by security forces.

He went on to reiterate the position of the Zamfara State Government: “There must be verifiable cessation of violence, disarmament, renunciation of criminality, appropriate accountability mechanisms, rehabilitation and reintegration, alongside adequate safeguards for affected communities. It cannot mean rewarding criminality or placing perpetrators above their victims. Effective security pressure can create the conditions under which genuine cessation becomes possible. Those who sincerely choose peace should have a structured pathway out of violence; those who reject peace and continue to terrorise innocent citizens must face the full consequences of the law.”

During the technical sessions, the following topics were presented and critically examined by the panelists: “Cross-Border Arms Proliferation and Intelligence-Sharing Dynamics”; “Insecurity in the North-West: Causes, Impacts, Challenges and Prospects”; “Insecurity and the Criminal Justice System in the North-West”; and “Strengthening Security Governance in the North-West through Multi-Agency Collaboration and Community Policing.”

Former Inspector General of Police Usman Alkali Baba, whose paper centered on security governance, argued: “Security governance encourages the adoption of a multi-agency collaboration approach, which is the integration of a whole-of-government approach to the security management architecture and optimal engagement with the security ecosystem. It is founded on the principle of inter-security agency synergy for the purpose of evolving a uniform understanding of the threat amongst state security services, developing mutual inter-agency trust and pulling professional assets together to present a common front against state adversaries and complement each other rather than work at cross purposes.”

The former police boss further stated: “Multi-agency collaboration remains a topical issue in the discourse on security governance. While it is undoubtedly critical in internal security management, my experience as Inspector General of Police indicates that the national security agencies, as currently constituted, are, in practice, more competitive than complementary in their relationships. Each agency operates largely in isolation rather than in synergy.”

He advocated the institutionalisation of a protocol, stating: “To compound these challenges, there is, as of today, no National Inter-Agency Coordination Protocol to clearly delineate roles, address the identified challenges and set out clear procedures to govern the synergy question amongst national security agencies within the national security space.”

In his presentation, CP Ahmed Bello, the Commissioner of Police in Zamfara State, described insecurity in the North-West as a complex crisis affecting Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara States. He noted that the region covers about 216,065 square kilometres, has an estimated population of 60 million and remains one of Nigeria’s major agricultural centres. Its international borders, forests and remote rural communities make effective security control difficult.

Bello traced the crisis from local disagreements over land, water and cattle to organised banditry, kidnapping, terrorism, cattle rustling, extortion and territorial control. He identified porous borders, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, vast ungoverned spaces, climate change, farmer-herder conflict, poverty, youth unemployment, illegal mining and ideological infiltration as some of its major causes.

He said weak border monitoring allows criminals, weapons and contraband to move through the region, while limited government presence and inadequate public services leave rural communities exposed. Environmental degradation, desertification and shrinking water resources have increased competition between farmers and pastoralists. Poverty and unemployment make some young people vulnerable to recruitment, while illegal mining provides money and logistical support for armed groups.

Bello cited figures showing the severity of the crisis. According to his presentation, 2,266 people were killed between January and June 2025, while more than 580,000 people had been forcibly displaced by February 2025. He also drew attention to the effects of insecurity on farming. In some areas, farmers are required to pay illegal protection levies before gaining access to their farms. This reduces food production and contributes to shortages and inflation beyond the region.

He identified difficult terrain, weak rural telecommunications, overstretched security agencies, inadequate equipment and training, fragile amnesty programmes, vigilante-related conflicts and poor regional border cooperation as challenges to ongoing operations. In his view, military and police action alone cannot produce lasting security without the restoration of governance and public services in affected communities.

CP Muhammad Rabiu, the Commissioner of Police in Kaduna State, described the North-West crisis as an adaptive security and governance emergency rather than a conflict involving a single group. According to him, banditry, kidnapping, extremist infiltration and illegal economic activities reinforce one another. What began as cattle rustling, rural crime and local disputes has developed into organised cross-border violence financed by ransom, extortion, stolen livestock and illegal mining.

Rabiu reported a 29 per cent increase in violence in the North-West in 2024, more than 900 fatalities in Sokoto between 2024 and 2025, and nearly 620,000 displaced persons across the region by 2026. His figures covered different periods from those cited by Bello, but both accounts brought attention to the human and economic cost of the crisis.

Rabiu noted that joint operations, including Operation Fansan Yamma, had dismantled camps and increased pressure on armed groups. However, some of the gangs had fragmented into smaller units, making them more difficult to identify and track. Intelligence gaps, community mistrust, weak inter-agency coordination, criminal financing, cross-border mobility and inconsistent government policies continue to limit progress.

He proposed a regional intelligence mechanism that would combine human intelligence, geospatial intelligence, financial intelligence and shared operational records. He also recommended providing security agencies with drones, reliable communication equipment, mobile units, forensic facilities and rapid-response capacity, particularly in rural and forested areas.

Rabiu called for the tracing of ransom and extortion payments, proper regulation of legal mining, the dismantling of mining sites controlled by armed groups, and closer monitoring of livestock and arms markets. He stressed the need for stronger border patrols and intelligence cooperation with Niger Republic and other neighbouring countries. Traditional rulers, religious leaders, women, young people and civil society organisations should also be included in protected early warning and local dispute-resolution arrangements.

AIG MS Dalijan (rtd), Commander-General of the Zamfara State Community Protection Guards, focused mainly on the origins, development and management of banditry in Zamfara State. He traced the early crisis to demographic pressure and growing competition over land. As farming expanded into grazing reserves and cattle routes, incidents of livestock damaging crops increased, leading to disputes over compensation and resentment between farmers and herders.

Dalijan said declining confidence in the formal court system encouraged both communities to adopt self-help measures. Farmers recruited local vigilantes known as ‘yansakai’, while some herders formed armed groups in forest areas. Cattle rustling and kidnapping for ransom later developed into an organised criminal economy supported by informants, arms suppliers and other collaborators.

He identified several alleged sources of weapons available to bandits, including armed groups in Chad and Libya, traffickers operating through Niger, attacks on Nigerian security personnel, foreign herders, Boko Haram, Ansaru and sponsors of illegal mining. He particularly mentioned the alleged activities of the “Arlit Boys,” whom he described as trafficking networks that exchange gold for weapons and move them from the Niger-Libya border into Zamfara.

Dalijan also said that cooperation between bandits and terrorist organisations had made the conflict more complicated, including the sharing of knowledge and materials for the production of improvised explosive devices.

On the security response, he identified the military, police, Department of State Services, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, Community Protection Guards, vigilantes and hunters as participants in coordinated operations in Zamfara. He noted that the Zamfara State Government had established the Askarawan Zamfara Community Protection Guards and provided drones, armoured personnel carriers and patrol vehicles.

He said these measures had reduced attacks along major roads and enabled many farmers to return to their farms. However, informants within communities, difficult terrain, inadequate air support, the need to avoid civilian casualties and growing cooperation between bandits and terrorist groups remain serious challenges.

Dalijan also examined weaknesses in the criminal justice system. He credited the monthly security coordination meetings convened by the Zamfara State Governor with helping to speed up investigations and court proceedings. However, he expressed concern about prolonged pretrial detention, the use of holding charges before sufficient evidence had been obtained, and the failure to separate minor offenders from hardened criminals.

He warned that keeping minor offenders with hardened criminals could weaken rehabilitation and expose low-level offenders to more serious criminal influences. He recommended the proper classification and separation of prisoners, the restoration of vocational programmes in correctional centres, and compensation and psychological support for victims of banditry.

Security consultant Dr Sani Abdullahi Shinkafi examined the legal framework governing criminal justice in the North-West. He explained that the system operates under the Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code or state Administration of Criminal Justice Laws, and Sharia criminal legislation in applicable states.

Shinkafi identified corruption, political interference, executive control of judicial funding and poor access to legal aid as obstacles to the administration of justice. He argued that political pressure and control over judicial funding could compromise the independence of the judiciary. He also noted that many courts lack digital recording equipment, adequate facilities and reliable electricity, while correctional centres suffer from congestion, poor sanitation, inadequate healthcare and limited vocational and psychological support programmes.

He recommended electronic surveillance and biometric monitoring along vulnerable border routes, with the involvement of the Nigeria Customs Service and the Nigeria Immigration Service. He also called for properly regulated vigilante and hunter groups, secure reporting and protection arrangements for witnesses and informants, and the use of the North-West Development Commission to support infrastructure, agriculture, education and employment in vulnerable rural communities.

In my own presentation as a panelist, my central argument was that insecurity in the North-West cannot be addressed through security operations alone. Arrests, rescues and battlefield successes will not produce lasting peace unless they are converted into proper investigations, credible prosecutions, fair trials and correctional outcomes that protect society.

Banditry is not limited to gunmen operating in the forests. It depends on wider networks of informants, arms suppliers, financiers, ransom handlers, illegal miners and receivers of stolen livestock. Our criminal justice response must therefore dismantle the entire criminal ecosystem rather than concentrate only on the armed men.

Police investigations must begin early, preserve physical and digital evidence, trace financial transactions and reduce dependence on confessional statements. Security and justice agencies across the North-West must share intelligence and coordinate investigations because criminal groups operate across state boundaries.

Prosecutors should work with investigators from the beginning so that charges are based on evidence that can be proved in court. Courts must also manage security cases firmly and promptly while protecting fair-hearing rights, witnesses and victims.

Correctional institutions must regularly review awaiting-trial cases, separate high-risk offenders and support rehabilitation, deradicalisation and reintegration. Communities must be treated as partners through confidential reporting channels, witness protection, timely feedback and properly supervised local security groups.

I recommended the establishment of a North-West criminal intelligence and justice coordination mechanism, mobile forensic teams, joint investigation and prosecution teams, and clear procedures for transferring suspects and evidence obtained during military operations to the police and prosecuting authorities.

Other recommendations included financial investigations into banditry networks, electronic tracking of cases, protection for witnesses and informants, and regular reviews of awaiting-trial detainees.

Implementation must go beyond creating committees. Every institution should have defined responsibilities, deadlines and measurable outcomes. These must be supported by transport, communication equipment, forensic capacity, trained personnel and adequate funding.

Success should not be measured only by arrests or the number of criminals killed. We should also measure the criminal networks dismantled, financiers and suppliers prosecuted, lawful convictions secured, victims rescued and protected, and communities safely returning to their farms, schools, markets and highways.

The conferees generally agreed that the security crisis in the North-West had gone beyond isolated incidents of criminality. Banditry, kidnapping for ransom, cattle rustling and other organised criminal activities have developed into networks that operate across state boundaries, exploit difficult terrain, and threaten rural livelihoods, food security, education, investment and social cohesion. Emerging urban threats, including local thuggery, substance abuse and the infiltration of radical groups, were also identified.

It was agreed that states must move beyond fragmented responses. Criminal networks do not recognise state boundaries, and the security architecture cannot afford to operate in silos. Intelligence gathered in Zamfara may prevent an attack elsewhere in the North-West, just as operations in neighbouring states may disrupt criminal networks threatening communities across the region.

There was also a consensus that the North-West needs stronger arrangements for real-time intelligence sharing, coordinated operations, interstate surveillance, community policing and the sustained disruption of the financial, logistical and supply networks that support organised crime.

At the end of the week-long event, the resolutions from the sessions were contained in a communiqué read by the Commissioner of Police in Zamfara State, CP Ahmed Bello. The communiqué called for coordinated security operations to be carried out simultaneously across the North-West, with the police taking the lead and receiving support from the military.

State governors were expected to take ownership of the operations, while traditional and religious institutions were to be involved. The communiqué also recommended functional emergency telephone lines, prompt responses to distress calls, handshake patrols and direct action against bandits in their enclaves. The supervising DIG for the North-West and the Commissioners of Police in the seven states were also expected to participate in the North-West Governors’ Forum.

On law enforcement and justice, the communiqué called for proper investigation and prosecution of persons involved in banditry and related offences. It proposed criminalising ransom payments, giving Area Courts criminal jurisdiction for the speedy administration of justice and establishing special courts for banditry-related cases.

It also recommended the creation of a Victim Trust Fund to compensate victims, as well as the reformation, rehabilitation and empowerment of convicted persons.

Other points included disarmament and reconciliation, the replacement of traditional cattle-rearing practices with ranching, and the blocking of identifiable cattle routes to restrict cattle movement. The communiqué also proposed laws prohibiting the Almajiri system because of the vulnerability of the children involved. An implementation committee was to be established immediately to ensure that the resolutions were carried out.

The discussions in Gusau brought out the different sides of the security crisis confronting the North-West. Security operations remain necessary, but force alone cannot provide a lasting solution. The region also needs functional institutions, credible justice, accountable leadership, economic opportunities, community trust and sustained cooperation among the affected states.

Samuel Aruwan is a postgraduate student at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. Email: [email protected]