Disgraced Indian cert issuer leaves the cert issuing business

We didn't want to issue SSL/TLS certs anyway, Indian firm suggests after one private key turns out to be the number 4

After embarrassing reports revealed weak private keys, one of which was just a single digit, Indian certification authority eMudhra has decided to take the L and get out of the global SSL/TLS cert game entirely.

eMudhra announced Thursday that it was abandoning that arm of its business. Sure, the intense scrutiny heaped on the company was a factor, but the firm also argued that growing compliance costs and competition from free certificate providers had made the business increasingly difficult to justify.

“Global SSL/TLS is a small part of eMudhra’s business contributing to about 1 percent of the global revenue,” the company explained, noting that free SSL/TLS cert issuance from large firms and increased compliance and data sovereignty requirements have made it a minor part of the firm’s operation, and one that doesn’t merit so much bad press.

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“The level of social media amplification around this incident has brought scrutiny that is out of proportion to SSL/TLS’s place in our business,” eMudhra explained. “In view of this, after detailed deliberations our board has concluded that withdrawing from global SSL/TLS is the right decision for eMudhra and its shareholders.”

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An argument could be made that, even if SSL/TLS accounts for just 1 percent of its global revenue, a private CA key with a value of 4 still deserves a thorough public shaming.

It’s only been two days since eMudhra’s weak private keys were exposed in public reports, following a report to Mozilla on October 17, and it wasn’t exactly hard for security researchers to recover them: The eight affected private-key values ranged from the number 4 (yes – a plain old number 4), to 56 and 66, to the far more complicated 115, 155, 156, 230, and 237.

No quantum computer required to crack those keys. Wow – better save the qubits.

This wasn’t just an embarrassing collection of numbers, either: The weak keys belonged to eight intermediate certificate authorities, potentially allowing attackers to forge certificates trusted by systems that hadn’t blocked them. eMudhra, however, maintains that the affected CAs had issued no end-entity certificates.

eMudhra quickly went on the defensive about its mind-boggling key-management failure, acknowledging the weak keys while pointing to independent audits and a problem during its key-generation ceremony that it said produced the weak keys alongside the intended strong ones.

“A flaw in the key generation ceremony caused a wrap/unwrap step to produce a second set of weak keys alongside the original strong keys,” the company said the day after the key fiasco was reported. “The weak keys were the ones published to the browser root stores.”

Despite that, eMudhra said the relevant certificate infrastructure had undergone two years of independent audits and had been in browser trust lists since mid-2025, raising questions about why the weak keys weren't caught sooner.

eMudhra claimed on Thursday that the affected CAs had issued no end-entity certificates, that it had revoked those CAs within 14 hours of discovering the issue, and that neither its infrastructure nor its data had been compromised as a result of its key boo-boo.

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Still, the incident has given eMudhra another reason to shave off a small part of its business rather than continue facing scrutiny over its certificate operations. It’s still going to issue a root-cause report and fulfill its remaining commitments to browser root programs as it winds down the business.

The company said it’ll continue to serve G1 RSA roots until it transitions customers to other certificate issuers, which it will do free of charge. 

“Revocation and certificate status services will keep running until every issued certificate has expired or been replaced,” the company said.  ®