What one flydubai flight revealed about the new India-Israel-Gulf map - opinion

The extraordinary events aboard a flydubai flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv were, first and foremost, a story of personal courage. Indian Captain Smit Machchhar was seriously wounded during the violent incident in the cockpit. 

Despite his injuries, he managed to help others gain access to the cockpit and regain control of the situation, preventing what could have become a far greater tragedy. The aircraft eventually made an emergency landing in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia, with 174 passengers on board.

His actions were quickly recognized in both India and Israel. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly praised his courage. There is always a danger in turning a dramatic human story into a geopolitical metaphor.  Machchhar did not act because his passengers were Israeli, nor because he was Indian. He acted as a professional responsible for the lives of the people aboard his aircraft.

That distinction matters.

Circumstances around flydubai incident tell us about shifting relations

But for those of us who study India-Israel relations, the circumstances surrounding the incident are nevertheless striking. They tell us something not simply about how India-Israel relations have changed, but about how the geography around them is changing as well. For decades, the relationship was viewed primarily through a bilateral lens: Delhi and Jerusalem, with defense cooperation at its center. That picture is no longer sufficient.

India and Israel have expanded their relationship into technology, innovation, agriculture, water, education, and people-to-people ties. In February, during Modi’s state visit to Israel, the two countries formally elevated their ties to a “Special Strategic Partnership for Peace, Innovation and Prosperity.”

But the more interesting transformation may be taking place beyond the bilateral relationship itself.

Consider the geography of Flight 1073: an Emirati airline, an Indian captain, Israeli passengers, an Omani co-pilot accused of carrying out the attack, and an emergency landing in Saudi Arabia.

None of these nationalities should be used to assign collective responsibility. The fact that the alleged attacker is Omani does not explain his actions, and until investigators establish a motive, it would be irresponsible to suggest otherwise. But Oman’s presence adds another layer.

For India, Oman is a longstanding strategic partner and one of its most important defense relationships in the Gulf. Maritime security, military exercises, and defense cooperation have become significant components of the partnership. For Israel, Oman occupies a very different position. The two countries do not have formal diplomatic relations, even though Muscat has at various moments demonstrated a willingness to engage with Israel.

This difference is important because it captures something fundamental about India’s position in West Asia: India can simultaneously maintain close relationships with Israel, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates without requiring those countries to have equivalent relationships with one another.

This is not an alliance system. It is a network of overlapping relationships between countries that do not necessarily share the same friends, adversaries, or political objectives.

That network has become increasingly visible in recent years. The Abraham Accords opened new possibilities for cooperation between Israel and Gulf states. I2U2 brought India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States into a new economic and technological framework. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor went further, imagining India, the Gulf, Israel, and Europe as part of a shared connectivity architecture.

For India, West Asia is therefore no longer viewed primarily through the traditional lenses of energy security, diaspora interests, and separate bilateral relationships. It is increasingly part of a wider strategic and economic space connecting India with the Gulf, Israel, the Mediterranean, and ultimately Europe.

Yet the events following the emergency landing also demonstrated the limits of this transformation.

Connectivity moving forward slower than diplomacy

Saudi Arabia allowed the aircraft to make its emergency landing, but Riyadh still has no diplomatic relations with Israel and reportedly rejected an Israeli request to send aircraft to retrieve the passengers. That apparent contradiction is, in fact, the story. Regional integration and political fragmentation are occurring at the same time.

Trade routes, airlines, technology partnerships, and strategic initiatives are creating connections that would have been difficult to imagine two decades ago. But they coexist with unresolved conflicts, the Israeli-Palestinian issue, the absence of Israeli-Saudi diplomatic relations, and very different political calculations across the Gulf.

Connectivity is moving forward, but not always at the same speed as diplomacy.

This is particularly important for understanding India’s role. New Delhi does not need to choose between Israel and the Gulf in the way observers once assumed it might. Its strategy has increasingly been to build parallel and sometimes interconnected relationships across the region while preserving its own strategic autonomy.

Israel, meanwhile, increasingly encounters India not only through the traditional Delhi-Jerusalem relationship but through a wider regional network that passes through Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Riyadh, and beyond.

What happened aboard Flight 1073 does not prove that a new Middle East has arrived. Nor should one extraordinary incident carry more geopolitical meaning than it can bear. Captain Smit Machchhar’s actions deserve recognition for what they were: an extraordinary act of courage under extreme circumstances.

But sometimes geography tells its own story. An Indian captain, an Omani co-pilot, Israeli passengers, an Emirati aircraft, and a Saudi landing site briefly came together on one flight between Dubai and Tel Aviv.

In that unlikely convergence, we caught a glimpse not of a completed new regional order, but of one that is still being built.