Red Sea conflicts converge as Ethiopia, Yemen, Sudan crises deepen regional instability - analysis

The conflicts stretching from Yemen across the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa are increasingly becoming interconnected. Renewed fighting in Ethiopia, the rupture between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sudan’s civil war, and tensions over Red Sea access are unfolding as Saudi Arabia faces threats from the Houthis and Washington weighs its next steps against Iran and its allies.

Reports over the weekend made it appear that Riyadh is considering backing a major offensive in Yemen. Meanwhile, the US is also looking at what may come next in Yemen.

A review of articles in Egypt’s Al-Ahram state media, Saudi Arabia’s Arab News, and the UAE’s Al-Ain presents different views on what is happening in the region. This matters to Israel as well because Israel has recognized Somaliland. A new article at Middle East Eye argued that Israel and Turkey may be competing in Somalia now. This means that what is happening in the region of the Red Sea has strategic implications far beyond the area involved.

The area is also huge. If you look at the conflicts in Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, it is a landmass of around 5.5 million square kilometers. This is about the size of half the continental United States.

The result is an increasingly complex strategic landscape. Egypt, Eritrea and Sudan are concerned about Ethiopia’s regional ambitions. Saudi Arabia is focused on Yemen and the Houthis across its southern border and the Red Sea. Meanwhile, the United States is considering its options in Yemen while confronting Iran elsewhere in the region.

Red Sea security crisis grows

It should be noted that the US has also increased pressure on the Sudanese army over the civil war in Sudan. The US wanted a ceasefire. It didn’t get one at the recent UN General Assembly. Other issues may be afoot, such as the conflict in Libya, amid reports that Saddam Haftar was in the UAE for meetings in September.

Ethiopia is at the center of one part of the emerging crisis. Renewed fighting involving the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and other armed groups has undermined the 2022 Pretoria agreement that ended the devastating Tigray war. The TPLF announced an alliance with six other armed groups shortly before the latest fighting began, according to the reports provided.

The fighting has now become entangled with Ethiopia’s deteriorating relations with its neighbors. Addis Ababa severed diplomatic relations with Eritrea after accusing Asmara of hostile activities. Eritrea rejected the allegations. Ethiopian military officials have also accused Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt of supporting forces fighting the federal government. All three countries deny involvement. Egypt recently expelled an Ethiopian diplomat in a tit-for-tat expulsion.

Egypt has been particularly careful to distance itself from Ethiopia’s internal conflict. An Egyptian source said to Al-Ahram that the crisis was an internal Ethiopian matter and emphasized Cairo’s stated policy of respecting sovereignty and non-interference. Cairo also rejected attempts to connect Egypt to Ethiopia's domestic turmoil. However, Egypt appears to be discussing developments with Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan.

What are the disputes between Egypt and Ethiopia?

Egypt and Ethiopia have their own longstanding strategic disputes. The Nile is one source of tension. This is linked to Egypt’s dam and the Blue Nile. Africa News notes that “the dispute is the latest in a years-long rift between the two countries over Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.”

There are other old grievances. Ethiopia lost its coastline when Eritrea became independent in 1993. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has subsequently portrayed access to the sea as important to Ethiopia’s economic and security interests. The reports provided note that Ethiopia depends heavily on the corridor through Djibouti and that Abiy has discussed the historical loss of Ethiopia’s coastline in increasingly assertive terms.

This puts Eritrea in a particularly sensitive position. Ethiopia and Eritrea were partners against the TPLF during the 2020-2022 war, despite their own history of conflict. That alignment deteriorated after the Pretoria agreement, which excluded Eritrea. Ethiopia's subsequent focus on Red Sea access has intensified Asmara's concerns.

The crisis therefore cannot be viewed solely as another round of fighting inside Ethiopia. It sits at the intersection of the Nile dispute, Sudan’s war, and competition surrounding the Red Sea.

Then comes Yemen. Across the Red Sea, Yemen adds another piece to this emerging strategic picture. The Houthis have transformed themselves over the past decade from a Yemeni insurgent movement into a regional actor capable of threatening Saudi Arabia and maritime traffic at the Bab al-Mandeb. Allied with Iran, they have ballistic missiles and long range drones.

How will the US respond to Red Sea tensions?

Iran's relationship with the Houthis connects Yemen to the wider confrontation between Tehran, Washington and US regional partners. This makes developments on the African shore of the Red Sea increasingly relevant to the security environment facing Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.

The Trump administration is now weighing its options. According to one of the reports provided to Al-Ain news, senior US officials met at Camp David on October 2 to discuss both Iran and Yemen. The meeting reportedly included Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and other senior national security officials. Yemen was specifically discussed as Washington considered whether to take further action against the Houthis.

Saudi Arabia faces a different calculation. Riyadh has sought de-escalation while making clear that attacks on the kingdom cannot continue indefinitely. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman recently reiterated Saudi Arabia's preference for diplomacy while saying the kingdom would respond to threats against its security. Former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal similarly argued that restraint has historically characterized Saudi policy but has limits when Saudi sovereignty is threatened.

The historical parallel is notable. Saudi Arabia and Egypt were on opposing sides of the North Yemen Civil War in the 1960s, when Egyptian forces intervened in support of Yemen's republican government. Prince Turki specifically invoked that period while discussing the kingdom's current security calculations.

Today the alignments are different. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have shared interests in preventing further instability around the Red Sea. For Egypt, security in the Red Sea is directly connected to the approaches to the Suez Canal. For Saudi Arabia, the same maritime space includes its western coastline and the approaches to Yemen.

This is where developments in Yemen and the Horn of Africa converge. The Bab el-Mandeb is the narrow link between them. Yemen occupies its northeastern approaches, while Djibouti and Eritrea sit on the African side. Sudan lies farther north along the Red Sea, while Ethiopia's lack of a coastline drives Addis Ababa's search for more secure maritime access.

Iran and the Houthis represent only one dimension of Red Sea instability. The possibility of renewed interstate conflict in the Horn could create another. For Eritrea, the primary concern is preserving its sovereignty and coastline amid Ethiopian pressure for sea access. For Ethiopia, dependence on Djibouti creates a strategic vulnerability that Addis Ababa wants to reduce. Egypt views Ethiopia through the additional prism of the Nile dispute. Sudan is fighting its own civil war while trading accusations with Ethiopia over support for hostile forces. Saudi Arabia must contend with the Houthis and protect its Red Sea coast, while Washington is deciding how far it wants to go in confronting Iran and the Houthis. Many regional countries are potentially involved in these conflicts, including the UAE in the Horn of Africa. Turkey is also involved in Somalia.

These conflicts are not a single war, and the alliances do not line up neatly. Nevertheless, geography is increasingly tying them together. The Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb connect the Horn of Africa to Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and ultimately the Mediterranean.

This means a new conflict involving Ethiopia and Eritrea would not remain merely a Horn of Africa crisis. Combined with the war in Sudan, Houthi activity in Yemen and the wider confrontation with Iran, it could add another layer of instability along one of the world's most strategically important maritime corridors.