Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the unresolved Pashtun question

Pakistan’s history offers a recurring warning: When the state mistakes regional dissent for disloyalty and electoral opposition for a security threat, it risks turning political grievances into an existential crisis. A recent editorial in this newspaper (‘The siege within Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’, IE, October 17) focused on the political factors leading to the declaration of emergency and the displacement of the elected government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). It, however, does not touch upon the Pashtun question, one that predates Pakistan.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s Khudai Khidmatgar movement represented an anti-colonial tradition that sat uneasily with the Muslim League’s vision of nationhood. The 1947 referendum in the North-West Frontier Province, which excluded independence and a separate Pashtunistan from its options, left enduring grievances among sections of Pashtun political opinion. Pashtun nationalism was subsequently viewed through the lenses of separatism, Afghan interference and territorial insecurity.

The parallels with East Pakistan in 1970-71 are not exact, but they are sufficiently unsettling to warrant scrutiny. In December 1970, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League won an absolute majority in Pakistan’s National Assembly. Instead of transferring power, the West Pakistani establishment (read: Military) treated the result as a threat. Negotiations collapsed, military repression followed, and civil war, Indian intervention and Bangladesh’s independence became the natural consequences. The East Pakistan crisis reflected a structural contradiction: Bengalis constituted the demographic majority but remained marginalised within the military, bureaucracy and commanding institutions of the state. KP presents a different situation, but the danger is recognisable. The PTI secured a strong mandate in the province in 2024. Its confrontation with the federal government and powerful state institutions has deepened Pakistan’s political crisis.

The question is whether emergency powers address a demonstrable security threat or neutralise a political constituency the establishment cannot defeat electorally. A genuine emergency must be necessary, proportionate, temporary and constitutionally accountable. When extraordinary powers circumvent the electorate, coercion replaces democratic consent. The comparison with 1971 is a warning.

Pashtun communities straddle the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, while disputes over the Durand Line have long complicated relations between Islamabad and Kabul. Afghanistan cannot simply be presumed to support Pashtun separatism. Nevertheless, when Pakistani Pashtuns experience political exclusion or coercive security policies, domestic grievances can acquire a cross-border dimension. Islamabad may interpret dissent as foreign interference, justifying further coercion. The resulting cycle is dangerous. Exclusion encourages external interest, external interest intensifies security anxieties, and those anxieties become grounds for further exclusion. Democratic accommodation is a stronger defence against foreign exploitation than suppressing legitimate grievances.

The PTI is a national party, not simply a Pashtun nationalist movement. Imran Khan’s appeal extends beyond KP, and its voters do not collectively endorse separatism. Yet when a party becomes the principal vehicle for a region’s political opposition, suppressing its mandate risks being perceived as suppressing the region itself. Pakistan faces genuine security challenges, including the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. These require effective action, but security concerns do not grant unlimited discretion to the centre. Provincial leaders, too, must demonstrate commitment to protecting citizens.

The ultimate test of Pakistani federalism is not how forcefully the centre compels KP to comply, but whether citizens believe their votes matter, their identity is secure, and their place in the federation rests on democratic consent. A state that refuses to hear its regions should not be surprised when, eventually, they stop speaking its political language and seek their own flag.

The writer is a retired lieutenant-general and former L-G of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Puducherry