The importance of self-criticism

Discussions of “cognitive warfare” in Taiwan often take an overly sensitive stance without ever taking the lead in setting the agenda. Many Taiwanese fall back on simplistic apologetics and complacent assurances that everything is fine. The underlying premise seems to be that as long as Taiwan projects an image of strength, there will be no cracks for China to exploit.

When seen from Beijing’s perspective, the flaw in this logic becomes apparent. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) relies heavily on positive messaging and tightly managed information to maintain political stability. Taiwan simply cannot beat an authoritarian state at its own game.

However, it can adopt a different approach in the battle of narratives: Acknowledge shortcomings to build trust and frame the debate in ways that Beijing cannot control. A friend of mine serves as editor-in-chief of a Taiwanese newspaper that takes a hawkish position on national defense and favors a stronger military. The paper maintains an official account on X, where its editors noticed an interesting phenomenon. Posts arguing that Taiwan was losing the arms race with China frequently spark a vocal backlash from fiercely pro-CCP users.

At first glance, this seems counterintuitive. It might be assumed that criticism of Taiwan would please Beijing, but the opposite happened instead. Criticism matters not only for what it says, but for where it leads. If criticism of Taiwan’s weaknesses provides an incentive for the nation to bolster its armed forces, improve its defense-industrial base and build a more resilient manufacturing infrastructure, then Beijing has reason for dismay.

A narrative that isolates areas in which Taiwan is weak and in which improvements need to be made, does not serve Beijing’s interests. It backs Beijing up against a wall. The communist party line is that Taiwanese society is suffused with defeatism and welcomes “a return to the motherland.”

If Beijing openly attacks Taiwanese voices calling for stronger defense, it risks undermining its own propaganda directed at the domestic audience. Such a condemnation would also affirm another truth for Taiwanese: The best and arguably only way to resist the threat from China is through greater military preparedness, stronger deterrence and a harder line against Chinese pressure. That is not the conclusion Beijing wants Taiwanese to draw.

Taiwanese commentators can openly ridicule Chinese military problems such as alleged crashes of advanced aircraft or photographs of a carrier emitting heavy exhaust during Chinese military exercises around Taiwan in August 2022. Beijing does not have the same luxury to mock comparable Taiwanese mishaps, such as when a vessel in the Coast Guard Administration’s 35-tonne patrol-boat construction program sustained a main-engine failure or when the coast guard displayed excessive caution by not using the Zhenhai multiple-rocket system during law-enforcement operations.

If Beijing were to scoff at the Republic of China military, it would be implicitly acknowledging that Taiwan and China are engaged in a military competition of opposing sides of equal rank rather than accepting Beijing’s preferred political narrative that “the Taiwan problem” is simply an internal matter.

Another blow to the CCP propaganda machine is that serious criticism of Taiwan’s defense establishment inevitably goes beyond individual equipment. It raises questions about bureaucratic rigidity, risk aversion and an institutional mentality that often prioritizes preventing mistakes over encouraging initiative or expanding capability. In other words, Taiwan has a bureaucratic culture that can become so concerned with avoiding problems that it becomes reluctant to get things done.

China suffers from many of the same problems. The difference is that China is an authoritarian state. Its officials do not have to worry about the risks involved in preventing abuse, so the CCP can sometimes push projects forward with fewer restraints. Aside from that, the same fear-based, responsibility-adverse bureaucratic rigidity is also rife in China.

Therefore, if the CCP dares to criticize Taiwan along these lines, the resulting public discussion could just as easily turn into a mockery of the Chinese government’s own institutional failures. None of Taiwan’s major opposition parties takes a tougher line toward China than the ruling party. If self-criticism is framed specifically around the effectiveness of such a stance, then opposition parties would find it politically difficult to attack that degree of introspection — and China even more so.

The purpose of self-criticism is not to denigrate Taiwan. It is to turn those weaknesses into arguments for military reform, institutional improvement and greater national resilience. Taiwan should not simply wait for China to establish the terms of cognitive warfare and then scramble to defend itself. It should define the terrain itself with honesty and purpose.

Wang Wen-sheng is a retired political operations officer and doctoral candidate researching the history of Australia’s and New Zealand’s ties with Oceania.